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Abstract 
The defeat of the Dyer anti-lynching bill in 1922 was a turning point in relations between 
black Americans and the Republican Party. Little is understood, however, about the role 
played in the debates by President Warren Harding. This article contends that Harding's 
conflicted approach to presidential leadership caused him to mishandle the bill. The 
President's inability to choose between restrained 'whig' leadership and a more active 
'stewardship' role resulted in an unstable executive style. The Dyer bill's failure was 
affected by this dilemma as black hopes were alternately raised and dashed by Harding's 
indecision. The bitterness of the bill's ultimate defeat was thus heightened, with severe 
consequences for the Republican party's long term electoral relationship with black 
voters. 
Introduction 
Between April 1921 and December 1922, the 67
th
 U.S. Congress debated legislation to 
make lynching a federal crime and empowering the Justice Department to prosecute 
individuals or groups accused of leading, aiding or abetting the activities of lynch mobs. 
SR.13 (known as the 'Dyer bill' after its sponsor, Missouri Republican Representative 
Leonidas C. Dyer) aggravated both racial and political tensions. Congressional debates 
were marked by predictions of social anarchy, appeals to constitutional precedent and 
contentious references to Christian scripture. The Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives passed the bill in January 1922 but, in December, Republican leaders 
abandoned it in the face of a Senate filibuster, enraging black political leaders, who 
believed the best opportunity since Reconstruction to eradicate a barbaric flaw in 
American democracy had been too quickly surrendered. 
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The contribution of President Warren Gamaliel Harding to the Dyer debates is a 
little-explored aspect of 1920s historiography. This is attributable, in part, to historians’ 
tendency to regard Harding as an inconsequential figure - a theme which dominated 
scholarship on the presidency during the half century following his death in August 1923. 
Until the mid-1960s, the 29
th
 president was typically portrayed as an unintelligent party 
hack, whose rise to power was engineered by Senate Republican leaders determined to 
curtail the  progressive energies of the executive branch under Theodore Roosevelt 
(1901-09) and Woodr w Wilson (1913-21). This negative viewpoint owed its much of its 
contextual imbalance to historians' reliance upon journalistic accounts of Harding’s 
administration which were often derived from anecdotal evidence, unsubstantiated 
rumours and the memoirs of the president's political opponents. Harding's performance as 
president, therefore, was either overlooked or trivialised. A modest 'revisionist' trend in 
historical assessments followed the belated release of Harding’s White House papers in 
April 1964 and grew more sustained from the 1980s as political and economic 
conservatism regained popularity. A small group of scholars focussed, instead, upon 
Harding’s popularity, patriotism, skilful media manipulation and strongly-defined 
political agenda.
1
 The stereotype of the vacillating president, subservient to Congress, 
was partially deconstructed by writers such as Robert K. Murray and John Dean, who 
indicated clashes between president and Congress as evidence not only of Harding’s 
determination to protect executive authority but also his readiness to wield it vigorously 
                                                 
1
 For a summation of relations between the Harding White House and the press see Stephen Ponder, 
Managing the Press: Origins of the Media Presidency, 1897-1933 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1999), 
109-120. For media manipulation by the 1920 Harding campaign, see John A. Morello, Selling The 
President: Albert D. Lasker, Advertising and the Election of Warren G. Harding. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 
2001). 
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when necessary.
2
 Andrew Sinclair depicted Harding as a shrewd political pragmatist. 
Paul Johnson, in the 1990s, went so far as to denounce pre-1964 literature as “an 
exemplary exercise in false historiography”.
3
 
Attempts to reconfigure Harding’s reputation, however, are problematic when 
applied to the 1921-22 congressional anti-lynching debates. Critical works, if they 
examine the subject at all, largely confine themselves to accounts of Harding's 1920 
statements on race and allegations of his mixed racial lineage. Later, more positive, 
accounts emphasise Harding’s October 1921 speech in Birmingham, Alabama. This 
address – the most controversial delivered by any president between the 1860s and 1940s 
– is used by revisionist writers to counter criticisms of Harding’s ‘passivity’ in office and 
to reinforce their claims that he had been an assertive president. Both sides, however, 
avoid detailed analysis of his responses to the anti-lynching debates. Sinclair, for 
example, criticises the Birmingham address, while Dean praises it but neither provides a 
detailed analysis of Harding’s overall handling of Dyer’s bill.
4
 Analyses of Dyer’s bill, 
therefore, have adopted a variety of analytical angles and conclusions but have 
conspicuously avoided a detailed examination of Harding’s performance contextualised 
within the post-1964 conceptual framework offered by revisionists. It has been argued 
that Harding was, or was not, fully supportive of the bill, that he did, or did not, attempt 
                                                 
2
 Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1969); John W. Dean, Warren G. Harding (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 
2004). 
3
 Andrew Sinclair, The Available Man: The Life Behind The Masks of Warren Gamaliel Harding (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1965). Paul Johnson, A History of the American People. (London: 
Weidenfeld and  Nicolson, 1997) 592. 
4
 Earl Ofari Hutchinson examines Harding’s attitude towards the Dyer bill in a broad survey of presidential 
attitudes on black civil liberties but does not focus solely on Dyer or reference post-1964 revisionism. See 
Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Betrayed: A History of Presidential Failure to Protect Black Lives, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996). 
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to promote its passage through Congress and that he was, or was not, guilty of failing to 
use executive influence to push it through. What is missing is an explanation of why the 
president chose such an unsatisfactory, almost maladroit, strategy and how this reflected 
his deeper dilemmas over the practical limits and proper usage of executive authority. 
This article contends that Harding’s inability to reconcile two conflicting aspects 
of his fluid political personality - the practical conservative politician and the supra-
partisan chief executive – caused him to adopt a double-handed approach to the Dyer bill 
which alternately raised and dashed the hopes of  pro and anti-reform activists and 
legislators. Harding was moving rapidly but inconsistently beyond the narrow confines of 
a traditional, conservative view of executive leadership and attempting to embrace a more 
dynamic and interventionist approach. In 1921-2, however, this process was both 
incomplete and erratic. It was, therefore, the ‘transitional’ character of his leadership 
philosophy, not simply racist sentiment or cynical partisan calculation, which lead the 
president to ensnare himself in a pattern of behaviour which left all sides exasperated and 
did little to enhance either Harding’s historical reputation or the Republican party’s bond 
with black American voters. 
 
1920 
The return of U.S. soldiers from Europe in 1918 added impetus to the drive by black 
political organisations toward greater equality at home. Their hopes were further raised 
by the declining political fortunes of the Democratic party, which had controlled the 
White House and Senate since 1913 and the House of Representatives since 1911. Under 
Woodrow Wilson, federal government facilities were racially segregated and low-ranking 
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black officials were replaced by white appointees. The Democratic Congress also blocked 
efforts by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), to 
pass federal anti-lynching legislation. With Republican majorities in Congress after 1918, 
however, NAACP officials made the passage of anti-lynching legislation their top 
priority. Efforts to mobilise support through congressional lobbying, petitions and 
newspaper advertisements increased. In 1919, an NAACP report - Thirty Years of 
Lynching in the United States: 1889-1918 - estimated that 3,224 people had been lynched 
over the past three decades,  2,522 of whom had been black Americans. Gunnar Myrdal 
noted that nine-tenths of recorded lynchings in this period took place in the South, with 
most of the remainder occurring in border states.
5
 NAACP figures recorded 156 
lynchings in the West, 219 in the North and 2,834 in the South.
6
 
Many Republicans considered federal action against lynching vital to the party's 
electoral future. By the early 1900s, traditionally Republican black voters had tired of the 
party's foot-dragging on racial issues. Republican presidents had occasionally defended 
black voting rights and attacked lynch-law.
7
 Benjamin Harrison, for example, denounced 
the mobs that "shame our Christian civilization" and called upon Congress to prevent or 
punish lynching in circumstances in which a constitutional right to intervene could be 
established.
8
 A combination of southern filibusters and clashing constitutional 
interpretations, however, hampered efforts to protect the civil and constitutional rights of 
black Americans. In 1906, Theodore Roosevelt denounced lynching in his annual 
                                                 
5
 Gunnar Myrdal; An American Dilemma (New York. Harper & Row, 1944) , 560-1 
6
 Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States 1889-1918. (Washington D.C.: National Association for the 
Advancement of   Colored People,1919), 7. 
7
 David O.Walter "Legislative Notes and Reviews: Proposals for a Federal Anti-Lynching Law" The 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 28. No.3. (June 1934) 436. Walter's exploration of the 
constitutional ramifications of anti-lynching legislation is still one of the most concise available. 
8
 Charles W. Calhoun, Benjamin Harrison (New York:Henry Holt & Co.,2005), 117. 
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message to Congress but avoided Harrison's call for direct federal intervention.
9
  
President Wilson had appealed to the states "to make an end of this disgraceful evil" but 
feared alienating southern Democrats by supporting any of the anti-lynching bills 
presented in Congress between 1913 and 1921.
10
  
The formation of the NAACP (1909) and the National Urban League (1911) gave 
black activism enhanced organisational capability and a sharper focus. By 1920, their 
leaders were challenging GOP platitudes on mob violence and states' rights and angered 
by party efforts to create ‘lilywhite’ southern party units in an effort to break Democratic 
electoral dominance of the south. 
In 1920, the five black members of the platform committee of the Republican 
nominating convention demanded the inclusion of firm pledges on federal protection of 
black voting rights and an end to segregation. Eventually, however, only one of their 
proposals was officially adopted. The platform urged Congress "to consider the most 
effective means to end lynching in this country, which continues to be a terrible blot on 
our American civilization."
11
 Although a mere request for Congress to "consider" action 
against lynching was less than activists had hoped for, it was, Richard B. Sherman noted, 
"the most specific recommendation of its sort to appear in a Republican platform in 
years".
12
 
                                                 
9
 Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex. (New York: Random House Inc. 2001), 472. TR maintained that lynching 
was not only indefensible but debased to the status of animals the adults who participated in it and the 
children who witnessed it. 
10
 Gunnar Myrdal, Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States. 5. The same argument was used by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s to explain his administration’s reluctance to back yet another federal 
anti-lynching campaign. 
11
 Official Report of the Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Republican Convention  (New York: The 
Tenny Press, 1920), 105. 
12
 Richard B. Sherman,  “The Harding Administration and the Negro:An Opportunity Lost.” Journal of 
Negro History. Volume XLIX. No.3. July 1964. 152 
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In June 1920, delegates to the Chicago Republican convention nominated 
conservative Ohio Senator, Warren Gamaliel Harding for the presidency. An amiable and 
loyal partisan, Harding's perceived strength lay in his ability to mediate between 
conservative and progressive factions of the party - hostility between which had cost 
Republicans the 1912 and 1916 presidential elections.  Conservatives were determined to 
reverse what they considered the trend to 'presidential government' apparent since the 
early 1900s. The concept of the 'stewardship' presidency, developed by Theodore 
Roosevelt and later refined by Wilson, envisioned a new role for the president as 
‘articulator-in-chief’ of the public interest, broadly defined by the president himself, over 
narrower sectional or partisan demands.
13
 This redefinition of executive power as a tool 
with which to shape socioeconomic and political issues in national terms and then 
mobilise national opinion and federal power in order to tackle them justified, to 
Roosevelt and Wilson, frequent, direct presidential intervention in congressional business 
and the manipulation of public opinion via the press. As such, the 'stewardship' model 
was popular with progressives who viewed the presidency as the ideal motive engine for 
reform and admired the administrations of Andrew Jackson (1829-37), Abraham Lincoln 
(1861-5) and Grover Cleveland (1885-9) precisely because they interpreted the vaguely-
defined constitutional remit of their office in the broadest sense. By the summer of 1920, 
however, Roosevelt was dead and Wilson incapacitated by illness. Conservatives 
believed voters had become disillusioned with the strenuous and confrontational 
stewardship style and yearned for a leader willing to govern in the more restrained, 
‘whig’ style of late nineteenth century presidents such as Rutherford Hayes or William 
                                                 
13
 The concept of the presidency as ‘steward’ of national interests was first articulated by Roosevelt in his 
book, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913). 
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McKinley or early twentieth century executives such as William Howard Taft.
14
 Unlike 
more ‘plebiscitary’ presidents such as Jackson or Roosevelt, ‘whig’ presidents stressed 
the importance of the constitutional separation of powers, the mediating function of 
political parties and the dangers of unrestrained majoritarian democracy. As such, ‘whig’ 
presidents rarely challenged Congress for control of the political agenda, preferring 
constitutional and partisan processes to operate with only moderate direction from the 
executive. Above all, they avoided the calculated rhetorical interventions of a Jackson or 
a Wilson which were ften deployed as weapons to intimidate Congress or steer public 
opinion. Republican convictions that voters wished to see a return to this milder brand of 
leadership  influenced the emergence of Harding as the party’s nominee. His 
uncontroversial Senate record was one of support for states' rights and laissez faire 
capitalism combined with an almost mystical respect for party government and for the 
independent authority of Congress. This made him the ideal candidate to pacify warring 
party factions and reduce federal activism. Harding's call for a period of 'normalcy' 
offered an appealing contrast to the bitterness of the later Wilson years.  
Harding's campaign speeches embraced the principle of a restrained presidency 
and denounced the ‘personal government’ styles of Wilson and, by implication, 
Roosevelt. Excessive presidential activism, he argued, had a corrosive effect on political 
stability. Both Roosevelt and Wilson had badly undermined their parties – and thus the 
coherence of the legislative process - by arrogantly failing to distinguish between the 
'national will' and their own personal ambitions. States' rights and limited government – 
two conservative totems - were also threatened by the executive's growing appetite for 
                                                 
14
 For a thorough exploration of the ‘whig’ concept of presidential leadership, see Michael J. Korzi, “Our 
Chief Magistrate and his Powers: A Reconsideration of William Howard Taft’s “Whig” Theory of 
Presidential Leadership.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol.33. No.2. June 2003. 
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federal expansion. Harding instinctively preferred the unassuming, consultative style of a 
Jefferson or a McKinley, striking dignified leadership poses for the public while 
exercising discreet influence in cooperation with his congressional party and a loyal 
cabinet. Locating this view in fashionable business parlance, journalist Mark Sullivan 
claimed that Harding would "have the same relation to leaders of his party in the senate 
that the president of a corporation has to his board of directors."
15
  This stance, 
inevitably, had limited appeal to groups demanding radical political or socioeconomic 
reforms since the’ consensual’ style was also predisposed towards gradualism. Harding’s 
opponents thus claimed that he had been handpicked by Senate leaders for the sole 
purpose of emasculating the presidency and handing direction of national affairs to a 
conservative Congress. Black political leaders reacted to the choice of Harding as the 
GOP standard bearer with guarded pessimism. 
 Harding addressed the issue of lynching during notification ceremonies outside 
his home in Marion, Ohio on 22 July 1920. He declared, "I believe the Federal 
government should stamp out lynching and remove that stain from the fair name of 
America"
16
  His choice of words immediately attracted attention since they appeared to 
expand the platform suggestion that Congress "consider" action into an implication of the 
federal government's moral duty to put an end to lynching. Harding continued, "No 
majority shall abridge the rights of a minority… I believe the Negro citizens of America 
should be guaranteed the enjoyment of all their rights…"
17
.   
                                                 
15
 Mark Sullivan "Senate Control of White House." The Atlanta Constitution. 14 June 1920. 5. Variations 
of this description would be later applied by historians to the management structures and leadership 
philosophies of both the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations. 
16
 Richard B. Sherman. “The Harding Administration and the Negro.” 153. 
17
 Randolph C. Downes, “Negro Rights and White Backlash in the Campaign of 1920”, Ohio History. 88 
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 Harding's campaign attempted to re-energise black Republican support, calling 
for a congressional commission to examine civil rights issues and reassuring black voters 
of his intention to reverse Wilson's policy of segregating or firing black officials.
18
 
Republicans also attacked Wilson’s policies in Haiti, using NAACP survey material 
passed on to Harding by its newly-elected head, James Weldon Johnson. 
Inevitably, this strategy worried sections of the white electorate. Harding, an 
inveterate political 'balancer', tried to straddle the issue during a campaign speech in 
Oklahoma City on 9 October 1920, declaring,  
 "…I wouldn't be fit to be president of the United States if I didn't tell 
 you the same things here in the south that I tell in the north. I believe in 
 race equality before the law. You can't give one right to a white man  
 and deny it to a black man. But I want you to know that I do not mean 
that white people and black people shall be forced to associate together in  
accepting their equal rights at the hands of the nation."
19
 
 
He thus countered his apparent embrace of federal activism in July by reaffirming his 
innate conservativism. Conceding that the federal government was obliged to morally 
support those seeking legal equality for all races, he nevertheless believed that 
Washington had neither the constitutional right nor the necessary enforcement powers to 
forcibly change southern political or social norms. He extended this ‘hands off’ approach 
to federal action in defence of black voting rights by refusing to endorse a 'force bill' 
sanctioning federal intervention to protect the rights of unfairly disenfranchised black 
voters.
20
 This measure, first championed by Henry Cabot Lodge in 1891, was hated by 
white southerners and a perennially useful campaign weapon for Democrats. Even if 
federal intervention proved a practical option, however, Harding's political convictions 
                                                 
18
 Eugene P. Trani, David L. Wilson, The Presidency of Warren G. Harding(Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1977) , 104. 
19
 Randolph C. Downes, “Negro Rights” 95. 
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would not have been comfortable with it. Born seven months after Appomattox, he 
shared with many of his generation an instinctive aversion to the use of federal force in 
the south.  
Leading black political activists, writers and civic leaders thus came to hope  that, 
as president, he would actively promote a federal anti-lynching bill which was entirely 
incompatible with his conservative philosophy. Harding avoided addressing the central 
dilemma of his strategy - how a president supportive of states' rights, wary of executive 
intervention and proposing to govern by consensus would handle a bill tailor-made to 
provoke southern anger and obstructionism. Although this ‘straddle’ was an effective 
election tactic, its drawbacks as a strategy for governing would soon become evident.  
 
Spring-Summer 1921 
On 11 April, Representative Leonidas Dyer introduced H.R.13 in Congress, "to 
assure to persons within the jurisdiction of every state the equal protection of the laws, 
and to punish the crime of lynching." The bill was referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary, a 21-member body with a Republican majority and a chairman - Minnesota's 
Andrew J. Volstead - considered sympathetic to the anti-lynching cause. Doubts over the 
bill's constitutionality had already been raised, not only by southern Democrats but also 
by Republicans such as Idaho Senator Bill Borah, whose main objection was to the 
expansion of federal policing powers. Borah’s correspondence with pro-Dyer activists 
constantly reiterated this point. "There is only one proposition which is involved so far as 
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I am concerned," he wrote in 1922, "and that is the constitutional question".
21
  Anti-
lynching campaigners based much of their case around the protection of citizen's rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment but this amendment, Borah argued, could not be 
applied in cases of lynching. "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. 
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the Amendment."
22
 
Section IV of the Dyer bill permitted federal prosecution of any state police or political 
officers deemed to have failed in their duty to protect lynching victims. Borah argued this 
was not only constitutionally questionable but also ineffective since "…this would not 
cover any case of lynching except where an officer was involved. If you will look over 
the list of lynchings…this bill would have reached about three or four out of a dozen."
23
  
NAACP officials also had misgivings. Moorfield Storey, the organisation’s president, 
considered Leonidas Dyer politically "inept".
24
 He admitted to Borah that another of the 
bill's provisions - that a county would become liable if a lynching party crossed its 
boundaries carrying their intended victim - was "obviously questionable".
25
  The 
NAACP’s legal adviser, Albert Pillsbury, believed the flaws in the legislation rendered it 
constitutionally unsound but James Weldon Johnson preferred it to the flaccid alternative 
offered by Republican leaders – an investigative commission. For Johnson, Harding's 
unexpectedly strong campaign rhetoric had heightened Republicans’ moral obligation to 
                                                 
21
Letter. William Borah (WB) to Troy W Pendleton. 18 Feb 1922. Washington D.C. Library of Congress. 
William Borah Papers.  Box 133. General Office File. Anti-Lynching Bill (Dyer Bill) 1: Dec 1921-Mar 
1922.  
22
 Letter. WB to Herbert H. Stockton. 12 May 1922. William Borah  Papers.  Box 133. General Office File. 
Anti-Lynching Bill (Dyer Bill) 2: Apr-May 1922. 
23
 Letter. WB to Editor, Boston Transcript. 8 June 1922. William Borah Papers.  Box 133. General Office 
File. Anti-Lynching Bill (Dyer Bill) 2: Apr-May 1922. 
24
 Mark Robert Schneider, We Return Fighting: The Civil Rights Movement in the Jazz Age. (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 2001), 184.  
25
 Letter. Moorfield Storey (MS) to WB. 31 May 1922. William Borah Papers. Box 133. General Office 
File. Anti-Lynching Bill (Dyer Bill) 2: Apr-May 1922. 
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unite behind Dyer and the bill’s passage was more important than its ability to survive 
later legal challenges. Johnson queried Borah, "does not the situation warrant the leaving 
of fine differences of opinion on the constitutionality of this legislation to the United 
States Supreme Court?"
26
  Such a tactic, Borah responded, would be "utterly 
shameless…utterly intolerable."
27
 
On 12 April, President Harding addressed a joint session of Congress to outline 
his administration’s policy agenda. In the early 1920s, a personal appearance by the 
president was still regarded by legislators as a vaguely provocative act. Although Wilson 
had normalised the practice, members were surprised that Harding, the arch-critic of 
'personal government', followed his example. Conservatives, who had expected that the 
new president would largely surrender control over legislation to Congress, were also 
surprised at the detailed agenda before them. Harding’s move was partly motivated by his 
deep resentment at rumours that his nomination had been arranged by a 'cabal' of senators 
seeking to weaken the executive's independent authority by electing a ‘puppet’ president. 
These had gained broad acceptance during the campaign, partly because Harding’s own 
attacks on “personal government” tended to reinforce press suspicions that he would 
prove a weak leader. On 6 December 1920, Harding used his farewell appearance on 
Capitol Hill to warn Congress members against any notion of a ‘Regency of the Senate.’ 
Reminding his audience of his rigorous defence of congressional independence during his 
                                                 
26
 Letter, James Weldon Johnson (JWJ) to WB. 7 February 1922. William Borah Papers. Box 133. General 
Office File. Anti-Lynching Bill (Dyer Bill) 1: Dec 1921-Mar 1922.  
27
 Letter. WB to Editor, Boston Transcript. 8 June 1922. William Borah Papers. Box 133. General Office 
File. Anti-Lynching Bill (Dyer Bill) 2: Apr-May 1922. 
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Senate years, he added, “I mean... to be just as insistent about the responsibilities of the 
Executive.”
28
 
Despite his campaign criticisms, Harding had, in fact, admired Roosevelt's 
dynamism and had endorsed Wilson's temporary wartime expansion of federal authority. 
He played upon the residual appeal of a ‘McKinleyesque’ campaign but did not believe 
the presidency could simply be returned to its late nineteenth century status. As a former 
newspaper editor, he understood the importance of the press, radio and cinema newsreels 
in mobilising opinion and took full advantage of the media's growing fascination with the 
presidency. Ahead of his first major address, the White House released five new 
photographs of the president for the 3 April 1921 edition of the New York Times.
29
  His 
address to Congress was clearly designed to attract press attention and strengthen 
Harding’s independent authority in the legislative process. This served to heighten the 
impact of his call for congressional action against lynching. Observing that lynch-law 
undermined America's claim to set an example of civilized behaviour to the world, he 
urged Congress to “rid the stain of barbaric lynching from the banner of a free and 
orderly representative democracy."
30
 
The reference to lynching was brief and the president's failure to name the Dyer 
bill disappointed some activists. The omission reflected Harding’s initial reluctance to 
dictate legislative priorities. He remained, at this stage, committed to building a 
cooperative relationship with Congress. His failure to mention the Dyer bill also allowed 
him to keep a potentially flawed piece of legislation at arm's length. While its passage 
through the House was likely, a narrower Republican majority in the Senate meant 
                                                 
28
 Robert K. Murray The Harding Era. 94. 
29
 Stephen Ponder, Managing the Press. 114. 
30
 Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era, 398. 
Page 14 of 37
Cambridge University Press
Journal of American Studies
For Review Only
Dyer’s backers could not overcome a southern filibuster without support from some 
Democrats. By omitting reference to Dyer, therefore, Harding could underline the 
administration’s desire to end lynching without prematurely triggering southern 
Democrat obstructionism. This was important if his main policy agenda - economic 
recovery, tax and budget reform, agricultural and shipping subsidies - was to pass 
Congress. Despite his election rhetoric, the anti-lynching campaign was not an 
administration priority. 
Nevertheless, his renewed call for action pleased W.E.B. DuBois. Writing in 
Crisis two months later, he called it "the strongest pronouncement ever made by a 
President in a message to Congress."
31
  The NAACP stepped up its efforts to secure a 
floor debate in the House, citing the speech as evidence of administration support. 
Harding's courting of media attention for his presidency had thus stimulated Dyer’s 
backers, making it harder for Republicans to finesse their platform commitment to black 
Americans.  
From 18 June, the House Judiciary Committee heard testimony on H.R.13. Both 
Attorney General, Harry Daugherty and his deputy, Guy D. Goff, defended its 
constitutionality.  Daugherty, writing to committee chairman Volstead on 9 August 1921, 
argued that the first seven parts of the 15-section bill were already covered by existing 
federal powers. He disputed the claim that Supreme Court rulings on the applicability of 
the fourteenth amendment since the 1870s had established a convincing set of legal 
precedents against federal intervention when denial of equal protection of the laws had 
been perpetrated by individuals rather than by state authorities. On the contrary, he wrote, 
precedent suggested the inaction of state authorities and their consequent failure to 
                                                 
31
 Richard B. Sherman, “The Harding Administration and the Negro”. 157. 
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protect the rights of citizens to equal protection of the laws, was as much a violation of 
the fourteenth amendment, as an active, purposeful denial of those rights. He confirmed 
the Justice Department would be willing to enforce the law and defend it in court.
32
 
Daugherty’s advice at this stage reflects the double-handed approach the 
administration seemed to be adopting. A politically safer move would have been to defer 
the question by following Borah’s lead in citing adverse judicial precedents, playing upon 
the private doubts of NAACP officials and suggesting the bill be redrafted to pacify the 
south. Instead, Daugherty and Goff followed the riskier strategy of supporting the bill’s 
constitutionality, with an endorsement which NAACP lawyers considered a masterly 
legal argument.
 33
  Absent a public contradiction from Harding, this endorsement stood as 
the official administration position on the Dyer bill. The fact that Daugherty was 
considered Harding’s closest political adviser probably increased activists’ conviction 
that the president himself was moving toward active support.
34
 Harding’s rhetoric had 
endorsed the spirit of the bill, Now Daugherty had defended its letter.  
 On 20 October, the bill was reported out of committee and Dyer urged Johnson to 
lobby for a special rule limiting debating time in order to circumvent southern delaying 
tactics. Johnson organized a deluge of "all the suasion and pressure I could command" 
                                                 
32
 Schneider claims, however, that the effect of Goff's testimony was to reinforce the fears of Democrats 
and some Republicans that the new law would trigger federal government intervention in a variety of state 
policing matters from lynching to bootlegging. Mark Robert Schneider, We Return Fighting. 175. 
33
 Christoper Waldrep comments that Daugherty’s summation was “longer and more convincing” than that 
presented in a landmark Harvard Law Review article twenty years earlier by NAACP legal adviser Albert 
Pillsbury. See Christopher Waldrep, African Americans Confront Lynching: Strategies of Resistance from 
the Civil War to the Civil Rights Era. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2009), 73. 
34
 Daugherty’s influence over Harding was often exaggerated by earlier historians, encouraged by 
Daugherty himself in his memoirs and by Harding’s detractors. Letters and official papers released after 
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upon the heads of Rules committee members.
35
 Harding's and Daugherty's statements 
were circulated in this lobbying effort. 
 
Summer-Fall 1921 
Harding responded to mounting pressure from anti-lynching campaigners by 
expressing sympathy while refusing to spearhead the effort from the White House - a 
strategy which was recognised, reluctantly, by some of Dyer's supporters as congruent 
with his election promise of consensual leadership. By the summer of 1921, however, 
Harding’s ‘executive restraint’ appeared to threaten the success of the normalcy agenda. 
His faith that Republicans would unite in support of his tax and budget reform proposals 
had been entirely misplaced. The party was riven with factionalism, enabling Democrats 
and progressives to stall the administration's agenda by playing one group off against 
another. Agrarian states pushed for costly agricultural relief programmes, blocking 
demands by eastern business interests for tax cuts and higher tariffs. Congress also came 
under intense pressure from the American Legion for a 'bonus' bill to pay cash 
compensation to war veterans. By July 1921, this legislative free-for-all was threatening 
to derail Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s tax reforms, prompting press criticism that 
the president was failing to assert his authority. Unexpectedly, Harding again appeared 
before Congress on 12 July to denounce the bonus as a reckless threat to economic 
recovery and to threaten it with his veto. The bill was returned to committee amid 
complaints that the president had blatantly disregarded congressional prerogatives and 
violated protocol. Press coverage of the intervention, however, was overwhelmingly 
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positive. Editorials favourably contrasted this display of executive authority with earlier 
predictions of weak leadership and urged Harding to intervene more often.  In November 
1921, columnist Mark Sullivan, an early sceptic of his leadership calibre, announced, 
“The fact is that the Harding who was a Senator and the Harding who is President are 
different men.”
36
    
This episode signalled the opening of a new, parallel track in Harding’s leadership 
style, utilising rhetorical interventions even as he continued to advocate inter-branch 
cooperation. This dual approach helped his public popularity but created as many 
problems as it solved. By demonstrating his willingness to wield power in the style of 
Wilson, Harding inadvertently diminished the credibility of his ‘restrained leadership’ 
stance just as the House debate on Dyer’s bill got underway. 
The implications of this dilemma became clear on 26 October 1921, during his 
visit to Birmingham, Alabama. Accompanied by Democratic Senator Oscar Underwood, 
leader of the anti-Dyer campaign, Harding addressed a segregated audience of thousands, 
roped off from each other to either side of the speakers' rostrum. The president was 
expected to indulge his penchant for 'bloviating' - his own term for making speeches 
containing lofty, uncontroversial platitudes. Instead, he delivered what was regarded as 
the most controversial statement on race relations made by any president since 
Reconstruction. 
 The president repeated his view that social segregation could not 
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be overturned, claiming that "a fundamental, eternal and inescapable difference" 
separated the races.
 37
 The black race should, instead, focus on self-improvement "as a 
distinct race, with a heredity, a set of traditions, an array of aspirations all its own."
38
  To 
facilitate these changes, he called for an end to political, educational and legal inequality 
and insisted southern states should stop "narrowing the Negro's political rights".
39
 
Reporters contrasted the "loud and lusty cheers" of blacks in the audience with 
reactions across the aisles. "The whites," according to the New York Times, "were 
silent."
40
 The president seemed determined to increase the impact of his remarks through 
direct personal appeals and confrontational body language. To the black audience he 
declared, "I want to look at you directly as I say this…because I am never going to say 
anything that I can't say to every section and to all the people."
41
  The New York News 
noted the "stony silence" of the white listeners appeared to anger Harding.
42
  
 
"The President's ire was frankly stirred up by this apparent coldness. During  
one tense pause, he squared his jaw and pointed straight at the white 
section of the crowd. 'Whether you like it or not', he said, 'unless our democracy 
is a lie you must stand for that equality.'"
43
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On the subject of political rights, the president declared, "… let the black man 
vote when he is fit to vote and prohibit the white man voting when he is not fit to vote…" 
and suggested that the Republican party's monopoly of black support and the Democrats’ 
hold on the south were both politically unhealthy.
44
 
Widely-differing verdicts emerged from newspaper coverage of the speech. To 
some, the president had simply restated old truths. "There was nothing new," the editor of 
the Montgomery Advertiser asserted, "in his presentation of the race question..."
45
 Others 
suggested Harding’s intention had been to reassure whites that segregation would remain 
unchallenged, stressing his distinction between social inequality and political and 
economic status. According to the Atlanta Constitution, "Upon this point, no southerner 
could have gone further than the president went in this statement of his position"
46
   
Others, however, attacked the address as blatant interference in southern affairs. 
The Montgomery Journal maintained that the ‘race problem’ had already been resolved 
to the mutual satisfaction of blacks and white and observed, “ it is to be regretted that 
President Harding…should have made this serious, if not fatal mistake this early in his 
administration."
 47
  Murray Stewart, mayor of Savannah, Georgia, called the speech 
"unfortunate and inappropriate”, adding, "If President Harding expected his speech to 
help…he has made a grave mistake…we of Georgia intend to keep the negro where he 
belongs and where he is the happiest, namely, the servant of the white race."
48
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Opinion among black leaders was equally divided. DuBois complained that the 
president's explicit endorsement of segregation undermined any potential benefit from his 
outspokenness while J. Silas Harris, President of the Negro National Educational 
Congress, described it as "sending a ray of hope into the homes of all honest 
Americans".
49
  
The President had "stirred up a hornets' nest" with this jarring departure from his 
usual conciliatory style but the speech’s long-term impact was compromised by its multi-
layered message. The manner in which it was delivered was, perhaps, more radical and 
noteworthy than its content, since the latter seemed open to the broadest range of 
interpretations.
50
 Some Dyer supporters, mystified at Harding’s repeated failure to 
endorse their bill, contented themselves with grim satisfaction at Senator Byron 
Harrison’s complaint that the president’s speech was “a blow to the white civilization of 
this country that will take years to combat.”
51
  
At first glance, the purpose of the Birmingham address seems unclear. Harding's 
biographers have struggled to place it within the broader contexts of either administration 
policy on lynching or Harding's evolving leadership style. Robert Murray, while 
considering it a remarkable address, described it as "shot through with political 
expediency."
52
 John Dean termed it "…the most daring and controversial speech of 
Harding's political career" but noted its main aim may have been to undermine southern 
Democratic control.
53
 This view was shared by Andrew Sinclair, who argued Harding's 
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speech revealed him "as the racist and segregationist that he was".
54
 Sinclair suggested 
that an "adroit plan" to hasten the end of white primaries, literacy tests and other devices 
used to disenfranchise black voters, thus boosting Republican support, accounted for 
Harding's "definite, if misguided, courage" in Alabama.
55
   
In a private letter, Harding admitted some partisan interest in long-term political 
change, adding, 
"my great hope is to see the matter so justly handled that we can get away from 
the bugaboo of the black race and establish a Republican party in the South. 
When that is accomplished we may hope for a prompter solution of the question 
in the more difficult details."
56
 
 
 The fullest explanation of his motives, however, came in a 5 January 1922 letter 
to an Ohio friend, Malcolm Jennings. "The impelling reason," he confided, "was the 
claim of the negro politicians for the performance of the things written into our platform 
and promised in the campaign."
57
  These promises included action against lynching, an 
investigation into the military occupation of Haiti, more black appointments to 
government positions and a bi-racial commission to consider strategies for improving 
race relations. By late 1921, little progress had been made on any of these items. 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes discouraged the Haiti investigation, while the 
commission idea had stalled in Congress. Harding had requested progress reports from 
each government department on the hiring of black employees but entrenched racism and 
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bureaucratic inertia meant progress had been negligible.
58
 Only on the Dyer bill was 
progress evident but Harding was only too aware that the main impetus for this was 
coming from the NAACP and pro-Dyer Republicans, not from the White House. His 
reluctance to risk his own political capital beyond a short paragraph on lynching in the 
April address to Congress was already drawing criticism from black and white civic and 
political leaders, who had hoped for a dramatic personal intervention similar to that made 
over the issue of the veterans’ bonus in July. He was pleased with the general press 
reception for his speech, noting that disapproval had come only from "some petty little 
partisan squirt or some blackguard sheet".
59
 Nevertheless, he deemed it a failure on two 
fronts. Dismissing accusations that his sole motivation had been partisan, he told 
Jennings that "the public man who thinks that he is going to break the solidarity of the 
South is dreaming.”
60
  He was also churlishly disappointed at the negative reactions of 
some black leaders, complaining, “I doubt now myself if it were worthwhile to have 
made the effort. The negroes are very hard to please."
61
 
Harding’s increasingly assertive presidential style was clearly displayed at 
Birmingham but the speech was, despite its daring, a rhetorical firework display masking 
a lack of clear direction or commitment on race issues. The president used the moral 
authority inherent in his office to prod the 'hornets' nest', thus enhancing his public 
popularity, while avoiding more direct intervention. In this sense, the address was a 
strategic error. In seeking further praise for his leadership style, he also renewed  
activists’ hopes that he was finally ready to come out fighting for the anti-lynching bill. 
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Instead, in the months after Birmingham, he moved further away from direct engagement 
with the campaign. 
 
Spring-Summer 1922  
The Dyer bill passed the House of Representatives on January 26 1922 by 231 votes to 
119.  The Senate's Judiciary Committee referred it to a subcommittee chaired by Borah 
which comprised three Republican and two Democratic members. None represented 
heavily black electoral districts and, as Johnson noted, most were constitutional lawyers 
sharing Borah’s aversion to leaving the issue of constitutionality for settlement by the 
Supreme Court.
62
  
 Still claiming to have Harding’s active support, the NAACP collected a petition 
signed by nearly half of the nation’s state governors, 39 city mayors and assorted state 
supreme court judges and clergymen. It reached Borah amid an accompanying deluge of 
letters from schools, rotary clubs and masonic lodges urging the committee to report out 
the bill quickly and favourably. Further pressure came from Senate Republicans, 
particularly Henry Cabot Lodge, who wanted the issue settled before the November 
midterm elections. Borah reacted angrily, complaining to newspaper editor James T. 
Williams that he had been forced "year after year to prostitute my intellectual integrity in 
trying to pass bills which we have no authority to pass."
63
 His clear resentment at 
Harding’s stirring up of black expectations was echoed by Iowa's Attorney General, 
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George Woodson, who complained that, "the utterances of President Harding has (sic) 
led them to believe that our Republican administration would take this step."
64
   
As thousands marched through the streets of Washington in support of the anti-lynching 
measure, the subcommittee eventually reported the bill out negatively. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee then passed it by a vote of eight to six on 29 June, with Borah 
joining the Democrats opposed.  
As campaigners celebrated the clearing of another legislative hurdle, the 
administration became almost mute. Responding to Johnson’s renewed plea for a specific 
endorsement, presidential secretary George Christian advised that "Legislation dealing 
with the matter is pending, and the President is disposed to doubt the propriety of an 
interposition of further counsel on his part for the present at least."
65
 This non-committal 
tone, in the aftermath of the Birmingham, and the secretary’s weak assurance of 
Harding's "continuing and very earnest interest in behalf of this cause" perplexed 
activists.
66
 The president’s interest in the matter was unchanged, Christian also informed 
Alice Carter Simmons of the National Association of Negro Musicians, as were his hopes 
that "results along the lines of your earnest desires may be brought about in the not very 
distant future."
67
  Some recipients of these anodyne replies became frustrated. Nick 
Chiles, editor of the Topeka Plain Dealer, praised Harding’s campaign rhetoric on mob 
rule and equality before the law but questioned his administration’s overriding 
preoccupation with tax and tariff legislation. Human rights, he argued, were more 
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important than those of lawyers and financiers but "much valuable time is taken up by the 
President to satisfy their whims over the difference of a few cents."
68
  Chiles concluded,  
"We stood and declared to the world that you were the second Abraham 
 Lincoln, but my people keep after me about my word. So now, President,  
please don't let my word fail."
69
   
 
 Harding was facing the ironic consequence of his success in countering early 
expectations of a weak presidency. The cumulative effect of his speeches in April, July 
and October 1921 had undermined the credibility of a non-committal stance by the 
executive on such a controversial piece of legislation as the Dyer bill. During 1921-2, he 
seemed to seek new opportunities to demonstrate executive independence and 
assertiveness, increasingly placing Republican party unity at risk. In late 1921, he ordered 
the release of the jailed socialist leader Eugene Debs, along with most wartime political 
detainees, over the protests of some Congress members and his own Attorney General. In 
September 1922, he carried out his threat to veto the bonus bill, provoking a strong 
backlash in Comgress where many Republicans voted with Democrats in a failed bid to 
override the veto. The president also pressed for U.S. membership of the World Court, 
placing himself on a collision course with Hiram Johnson, the Senate’s leading 
isolationist. Most significantly, the administration intensified its lobbying efforts for a 
ships subsidies bill designed to create a viable national merchant marine. The tactics 
deployed by the White House – a combination of  aggressive arm-twisting, patronage and 
implied threats – were another throwback to the Wilson era and far removed from the 
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‘consensual government’ promised by candidate Harding in 1920. Disillusioned with his 
party’s disunity and, as he saw it, disloyalty to the administration, Harding had begun to 
despair of his earlier hopes for cooperation. He wrote to a close friend, “I find I cannot 
carry my pre-election ideals of an Executive keeping himself aloof from Congress.”
70
 By 
August 1921, the Literary Digest was already praising the change in Harding’s approach, 
terming it a “gradual drift in the direction of aggressive leadership”.
71
 The journal’s 
choice of words was instructive, however. Harding’s assertiveness was neither 
predictable nor politically consistent, as the differences in his handling of the bonus, the 
shipping subsidies, the World Court and the Dyer bill demonstrated. A McKinley-esque 
‘whig’ on some issues and a Rooseveltian ‘steward’ in others, the president veered 
uncertainly between both approaches over the Dyer bill, unable to firmly commit himself 
to champion the legislation but hoping to gain credit for speaking out on the issue and 
boosting black voter morale. His early speeches in April and October 1921 had ratcheted 
up black expectations and provoked both hope and irritation among Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress. This made it impossible for Harding to adopt a lower profile, as 
he tried to do after Birmingham, without confusing and disappointing black activists. 
The inconsistencies in Harding’s leadership were not lost on Johnson. "I am sorry 
the President takes this view of the matter”, he wrote George Christian on 6 July, “…in 
view of the fact that he has been reported as recently urging upon Congress the enactment 
of other legislation."
72
 Johnson recognised the fatal potential of the threatened southern 
filibuster against the Dyer bill in the Senate but believed that the president should stand 
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by the bill to the end. Defeat was likely but a ‘moral victory’ could still be won. His 
frustration reached a peak when, on 18 August, Harding again intervened in Congress, 
this time to express concern over recent labour disturbances which, he noted, had also 
threatened the lives of foreign citizens living and working in the U.S.
73
  The situation, he 
declared, had potentially international repercussions. The president concluded,  
 
"One specific thing I must ask at your hands at the earliest possible moment. 
There is pending a bill to provide for the better protection of aliens and for the 
enforcement of their treaty rights. It is a measure, in short, to create a  
jurisdiction for the federal courts through which the national government will 
have appropriate power to protect aliens in the rights secured to them…"
74
 
 
He cited the long history of presidential requests for action, including President 
Harrison's plea for action due to "the embarrassment which grew out of the lynching of 
eleven aliens in New Orleans in 1891."
75
  He also recalled President Taft's attack on the 
"pusillanimous position" of federal authorities in making "definite engagement to protect 
aliens and then to excuse the failure to perform these engagements by an explanation that 
the duty to keep them is in states or cities, not within our control."
76
  The recent ‘Herrin 
massacre’ had appalled the nation by its "butchery of human beings, wrought in 
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madness…"
77
  Congress, Harding concluded, should end "the humiliation which lies in 
the federal Government's confessed lack of authority to punish that unutterable crime."
78
 
The speech was reminiscent of his 1920 comments on lynching but his 
willingness to publicly endorse and demand passage of the bill, sponsored by Senator 
Frank B. Kellogg, contrasted starkly with his attitude toward the Dyer bill. The White 
House view that protection for foreign workers across the U.S. was a federal 
responsibility beyond the scope of the states’ rights doctrine failed to persuade Dyer's 
supporters that the administration was not guilty of double standards. 
Under the circumstances, Johnson's next telegram to the White House was 
remarkably restrained. "It is necessary to protect the lives of aliens through Federal 
authority,” he agreed, “but is it not equally important to say the least that the lives of 
American citizens be protected from mobs as well?"
79
   
Four days later, a New York Times article headlined "Harding For Kellogg Bill: 
President Prefers It To Dyer Anti-Lynching Measure." implied that Harding’s lingering 
private doubts over the constitutionality of the Dyer bill explained the disparate treatment 
accorded to the two bills, with the president regarding the Kellogg bill as more likely to 
pass Congress.
80
 Fears that this would undermine Republican resistance to the 
Democratic filibuster prompted the NAACP to telegraph the White House, "We cannot 
believe our Chieftain will oppose passage. We still have faith in God and you."
81
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On the day the article appeared, First Lady Florence Harding became seriously ill 
and lay close to death through the first half of September 1922.
82
 Distracted, Harding 
carried out only essential duties and passed most of his daily correspondence to his 
secretaries. On 8 September, George Christian replied to Johnson’s telegram of 22 
August, assuring him that the Times was mistaken. "My understanding of the President's 
attitude," he explained, "is that he does not consider that the Dyer Bill and the Kellogg 
Bill conflict with each other at all. He believes the one is necessary to meet one particular 
situation, and the other to meet another situation."
83
 Thus far, Christian maintained the 
administration's vaguely positive line. The next paragraph, however, appeared to go 
further. The president, Christian explained,  
 
"feels that the purpose which the Dyer bill is intended to further is so important 
that the legislation ought not to be held up by reason of some uncertainties as to 
what the courts might finally decide about it…his attitude is that the legislation 
ought to pass and put the question up squarely to the courts for determination."
84
 
 
This shift in the administration's public line may have been an effort to counter 
any impression that the president had boxed himself into a corner by directly endorsing 
Kellogg’s bill. The Times article and Johnson’s letter both suggest that direct 
comparisons were being made between the president’s handling of the two bills. Though 
Christian’s reply lacked the headline-grabbing impact of the Kellogg endorsement, it was 
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the specific endorsement Johnson had long sought. He urgently requested permission to 
release it to the public, simultaneously asking Ohio Senator Frank B. Willis and New 
York's William M. Calder to press the White House on his behalf. Christian’s response to 
all these requests was that the White House would not object to publication. 
Despite the new statement, the Dyer bill was blocked in September 1922, by a 
tightly-coordinated filibuster organised by Senators Underwood and Harrison. The Senate 
adjourned for two months after which, Underwood predicted to reporters, government 
business would continue to be stalled until the bill was withdrawn. “This bill,” he 
declared, “is not going to become a law at this session of Congress."
85
    
 
Fall 1922 
The Senate filibuster was another ironic reflection on Harding's changed political 
perspectives. Campaigning in 1920 for the  ‘restoration’ of Congress’s prerogatives, he 
had described the Senate as a source of stability and wisdom in guiding the nation's 
affairs. Its collective experience was more valuable and reflective of public opinion than 
that of the presidency. Its tradition of long debates and filibusters, he claimed, ensured 
the fullest consideration of all viewpoints, safeguarding the rights of smaller states and 
groups against larger ones and also against dictatorial presidents. There was, Senator 
Harding had claimed, "not a more helpful thing in all our popular government."
86
 
By late 1922, his own administration was hamstrung by these ‘safeguards’. Its 
proposal for government subsidies for private contractors to buy up over one thousand 
unwanted naval vessels in the construction of a merchant marine was being resisted by 
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farm state members who routinely opposed federal aid for business. After heavy 
Republican losses during the 1922 midterm elections, Harding called the lame-duck 67
th
 
Congress into special session in an attempt to ram the bill through. Anti-lynching 
campaigners demanded the Dyer bill also be taken up as a priority. Pressure from within 
the GOP mounted during October and November. On 4 October, Lodge gave his "most 
cordial support" for the National Equal Rights League's request that Dyer’s bill be 
declared a priority.
87
 White House responses, however, now reverted to the bland format 
of the previous summer, assuring correspondents of the president's continued interest but 
arguing that further statements of support were unnecessary. 
On 14 October, Representative Harry C. Gahn (R-Ohio) warned the White House 
that black voter registration in Ohio’s 21
st
 district was "about one-half of what it should 
be." A clear public statement of support, he urged, "would surely convince them that your 
administration means to become interested in this bill." 
88
  
Harding’s correspondence during this period reveals his continuing aversion to 
federal intervention in state affairs. On 2 November, 1922, Louisiana Governor John 
Parker appealed for Washington’s help in ending Ku Klux Klan influence over of a large 
section of the state. He asked the president and Attorney General Daugherty to consider 
removing disloyal state officers and police officials. Harding replied, "Frankly, I am very 
greatly surprised… I fear the proposal of federal interference with the police powers of 
the state would develop a policy very likely to be resented throughout many states of the 
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Union…"
89
 His conservative views on federal intervention in domestic state policing 
matters, despite Daugherty’s letter to Volstead in 1921, had never altered. 
Congress was called into special session on 9 November, but Harding’s message 
contained no reference either to lynching or Dyer’s bill. Both were also absent from his 
address to Congress on 21 November. George Christian explained to Johnson that the 
president had found it necessary to keep the speech "exclusively to the one subject of the 
Merchant Marine."
90
   
Ohio Representative Harry Davis, concerned at the long-term repercussions for 
Cleveland’s 11
th
 ward of abandoning Dyer, lectured the president "you, as the leader of 
the Republican party, should take more than a passive interest in a measure promoting 
simple justice." He praised Harding’s influence on the debates. "Your repeated 
denunciations of mob violence," he noted, "have, in my judgment, been the highest 
expressions on this point of any president.”
 91
  Nevertheless, he insisted the consequences 
of Harding’s ad hoc forays into moral leadership were clear. Senate Republicans should 
be forced to “face this matter without flinching."
92
 
On 3 December, Republican congressional leaders flinched. Lodge informed 
reporters, "…it was our duty to set aside the Dyer bill and go on with the business of the 
session."
93
 
Harding blamed the defeat on the Senate's "inability to function," arguing that 
only procedural reforms could have broken the filibuster.
94
 "Frankly," he told Harry 
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Davis , "I do not think it possible to effect their revision during the present short term of 
the Congress."
95
 He predicted renewed efforts in the future, "but it will avail nothing to 
deceive one's self about the inability of the Senate to sweep aside the filibuster".
96
 Davis 
disagreed, suggesting prolonged, negative press coverage of the filibuster would have 
badly damaged the Democrats. Republicans, he warned, underestimated black voter 
resentment, which had now “developed into a rather bitter cynicism, a belief that the 
party...surrendered too easily."
97
 Harding’s reply included a sarcastic comment that 
continuing the deadlock "for purely educational purposes" was a futile strategy.
98
   
  The president’s rather emotionless response aroused cynicism over his motives, 
particularly as he seemed to tailor justifications for his strategy to suit different 
audiences.  To Davis, he blamed the defeat on arcane Senate rules. In a letter written on 
the same day to former Oregon Senator Jonathan Bourne, however, he implied that 
presidential backing for anti-lynching legislation was not possible. “I have to proceed 
tactfully to avoid paralysing the activities of the government," he told Bourne, “One thing 
we need in the United States at the present time is a period of relief from the threat of 
disturbing legislation.”
99
 This pragmatic assessment could be viewed as indicative of 
Harding's real motivations, since it echoed his campaign call for a “return to normalcy.” 
It was, however, disingenuous. While sacrificing the Dyer bill on the altar of inter-branch 
harmony, he was ready to fight battles in Congress over World Court membership and 
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the shipping subsidies bill with a combativeness which brought executive-legislative 
relations to their lowest point in four years.  
 
Conclusion 
 President Harding’s role in the anti-lynching debates is largely an irrelevance to 
traditional historians, whose contempt for his ‘weak’ leadership automatically discounted 
his influence in any policy area between 1921 and 1923.  Later ‘revisionist’ perspectives, 
tended to overcompensate by exaggerating the significance of the Birmingham speech 
and by over-playing his ‘endorsement’ of the Dyer bill. This article has attempted to 
explain the erratic nature of Harding’s approach to the anti-lynching debate by comparing 
and contrasting each presidential statement or phase of inaction during the anti-lynching 
debates to successive, definable phases in his changing leadership style. It concludes that 
while Harding displayed unexpectedly strong leadership traits in dealing with the bonus 
bill, the World Court and the shipping subsidies debates, his handling of the Dyer bill 
stands out as a poorly-conceived, conflicted mixture of leadership approaches and 
political motives, reflecting his inner uncertainty over the appropriate role for the chief 
executive in the early 1920s U.S. political system. Harding was clearly disillusioned by 
the failure of his early efforts at consensual leadership and increasingly disposed to 
disregard party unity and the views of Congress in his defence of executive authority. His 
conversion to strong leadership, however, was incomplete and unpredictable. Moving 
back and forth between restrained ‘whig’ and interventionist ‘steward’ stances, he 
succeeded only in raising and dashing hopes, angering southern Democrats and alienating 
some Republicans, while offering varied explanations of his motives and remaining 
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curiously indifferent to the confusion caused by his tactics. Harding appeared not to 
understand the expectations he had aroused or the disappointment which greeted his 
failure to follow them through with active leadership.  
From 1923, lynching rates across America fell markedly, a phenomenon which 
may be partly attributed to the impact of the Dyer debates. Black disenchantment with the 
Republican party remained deep, however. Within a year of the bill’s abandonment, the 
NAACP officially recommended that its members redefine themselves as ‘independents’. 
It also campaigned actively against any Republican members of Congress who had 
opposed the Dyer bill. President Harding’s performance was not solely responsible for 
this rapid deterioration in relations between the Republican party and the black electorate. 
Nor had he ever had the power to break the Senate filibuster single-handed.  Nonetheless, 
his angry assertiveness as president by 1923 had attracted widespread attention. By the 
end of his administration, the satirist H.L. Mencken observed, Harding was “rocking his 
own boat so violently that many of his most faithful partisans were coming down with 
mal de mer.”
100
 
Had Harding wielded the political and moral authority of the presidency to 
champion the Dyer bill with the same vigour and consistency he displayed over the 
bonus, subsidies and Kellogg bills, he would have gained more praise for his vision and 
political courage, whatever the consequences for party unity or southern Republicans, 
than he eventually received from generations of unimpressed historians. 
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